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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Were material misrepresentations intentionally or

recklessly included in the affidavit in support of the search
warrant and material information intentionally or recklessly
excluded therefrom so as to invalidate the affidavit and search
warrant in this case under the fourth amendment to the federal
constitution?
2.

Is there sufficient rationale and precedent for a

determination under the facts of this case that Article I, § 14 of
the Utah Constitution requires a different analysis from the fourth
amendment in this context, in particular (a) that intentional
misrepresentations in a search warrant affidavit require
invalidation of the entire warrant under the Utah Constitution, and
(b) negligent misrepresentations must be excised and the remaining
portions reviewed for a determination of probable cause under our
state constitution?

iv

TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, § 14 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized.
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Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.

Case No. 880274-CA
Priority No. 2

STEVEN J. PYEATT,
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OPINION BELOW
The unpublished "Memorandum Decision" of the Court of
Appeals in State v. Pyeatt, slip op., Case No. 880274-CA (filed
April 20, 1989), is attached hereto as Appendix A.

On May 4, 1989,

Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of
Appeals.

On May 9, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied Appellant's

Petition for Rehearing (Appendix B).
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on April 20,
1989.

The Petition for Rehearing tolled the time in which this

Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be filed.
the Utah Supreme Court (1986).

Rule 45(c), Rules of

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant

to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to
Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988); Unlawful Possession of a
Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988); and
Unlawful Possession of Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1986), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah,
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed the conviction in a decision dated April 20, 1989.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 10, 1987, Judge Sheila McCleve issued a search
warrant for the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West,
Salt Lake City, Utah (Appendix C ) . The search warrant authorized a
search for "[c]ocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents,
packaging and scales." _Id. at 1.
As the Court of Appeals acknowledged in its opinion, the
affidavit in support of the search warant contained "somewhat
inaccurate and incomplete statements."

Slip op. at 4 (Affidavit set

forth in Appendix D). Among such "inaccurate" and "incomplete"
statements was a statement that, within the past ten days, officers
had executed two controlled buys at the premises to be searched.
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Appendix D at 2.

This statement was false since neither the C.I.

nor the officers had been inside the premises at 533 Montgomery
(Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing held September 17, 1987,
hereinafter "T", at 19, 20); nor had the officers or the C.I. had
contact with the occupants of the Montgomery residence (T. 19, 20).
In fact, at the time the officers executed the search warrant, they
did not know who occupied the Montgomery residence (T. 19, 20).
The affiant, Deputy Michael Droubay, stated in the
affidavit that the officers sent the C.I. into an apartment on
Atherton Avenue with money and instructions to buy cocaine on two
occasions (Appendix D at 2-3). On each occasion, shortly after the
C.I. entered the Atherton apartment, the officers observed a man
leave that apartment and drive to the Montgomery address. _Id. at
7.

According to the affidavit, that man was "Randy," who the C.I.

had pointed out as the dealer at the Atherton apartment.
You affiant received information, at that time,
from the C.I. as he entered the apartment, he was
greeted by the suspect, known to us as RANDY. He
handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY then left
the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the
cocaine.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
However, according to Droubayfs testimony, although Randy
was the focus of the investigation at the Atherton apartment (T. 9),
the person who left the apartment and drove to the Montgomery
address on each of the two occasions was Brad, a "blonde-haired
younger fellow" (T. 13).
His first name was Brad . . . He was identified to
us by the C.I. at the time of the first controlled
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buy. We knew who was going to be doing the
driving; we knew who we had to follow.
(T. 15-16).
After reviewing the affidavit*, Droubay's testimony
changed significantly.

He stated that "it's common for dealers of

controlled substances to use an alias" (T. 18) and suggested that
the "confusion" about the names was the result of the driver using
an alias (T. 48).
Travel time from the Atherton apartment to the Montgomery
house took twelve to sixteen minutes each way; the "driver" stayed
at the Montgomery house twenty-two minutes on the first occasion and
eight minutes on the second (1^3. at 2-4).
According to the affidavit, on the first occasion, the
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware
that RANDY was at the Montgomery address, C.I.
received, at the Atherton address, a phone call
from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and
that RANDY would be back.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
Droubay failed to inform the judge, among other things,
that, during the time the "driver" was in transit or at the
Montgomery address on each of the two occasions, no officers were at
the Atherton apartment and the C.I. and Atherton apartment were
therefore unobserved during that period (T. 65). At the hearing,
Droubay attempted to cover this lapse by testifying that an officer
may have been keeping the Atherton apartment under surveillance

1

Until page 16 of the transcript of the hearing, Droubay
testified from his notes. Defense counsel then supplied him with a
copy of the affidavit, which he reviewed (T. 16).
- 4 -

while the others drove to the Montgomery house (T. 38-9).

(See

Appendix E for transcript of Droubay's testimony regarding lapses in
surveillance of Atherton apartment.)
The three other officers involved testified that no one
remained at the Atherton residence (T. 72, 84). 2
The affidavit also did not inform the judge that the C.I.
had had no dealings with the occupants of 533 Montgomery and had
never been there (T. 19, 20) and that persons other than "Randy"
frequented or lived at the Atherton apartment.
Deputy Droubay further stated in the affidavit that:
Independent surveillance also supports the fact
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that
the persons residing in the residence are usually
away during the day.
Appendix D at 4.

However, Deputy Droubay watched the Montgomery

house on only three occasions.

One of those occasions was during

the day and two were at night.

During all three surveillances, he

saw only three people enter or leave the Montgomery house
(T. 66-7).

Although he stated in the affidavit that the people who

reside at the Montgomery house were "usually away during the day,"
he testified that he did not know who resided in the house and that,
during his single daytime visit, he saw children present (T. 59-60).
The trial court denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress the
evidence seized from the Montgomery address (R. 79). Defense

2 Officer Rigby testified further that, had it been his
case, he would have left an officer to observe the Atherton
residence so that he would not have had to rely completely on the
C.I. (T. 80) and that people other than Randy residing at the
Atherton location were under suspicion (T. 80).
- 5 -

counsel renewed her Motion to Suppress at trial, and the trial judge
again denied such motion.

(See Appendix F for trial court's ruling.
ARGUMENT

POINT I. IN DECIDING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT AND
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE VALID UNDER THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED
EXISTING CASE LAW,, MISAPPREHENDED THE FACTS, AND
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW WHICH SHOULD
BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT,
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS IN THE
AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Mr. Pyeatt claimed at trial and on appeal that the fourth
amendment to the federal constitution was violated in this case
where the affiant, Deputy Michael Droubay, intentionally or
recklessly included material misrepresentations in and left out
material information from the affidavit (Appellant's Opening Brief
at 17-31).

In its opinion, the Court of Appeals, with very little

discussion, found that no fourth amendment violation occurred in
this context.

Slip op. at 4-5.

The Court of Appeals specifically found that implicit in
the trial judge's finding that Officer Droubay did not act in bad
faith was a finding that "Droubay did not knowingly, intentionally,
or recklessly include false statements or omit material information
in his affidavit [citation omitted]," slip op. at 4.

The Court

determined that such an implicit finding by the trial court was not
clearly erroneous and that Mr. Pyeatt had "not presented any
compelling evidence that Droubayfs somewhat inaccurate and
incomplete statements were made knowingly, intentionally or
recklessly."

Id.

The Court of Appeals stated:

We find it more likely that the misstatements were
the result of Droubay's confusion, oversight, or
ineptitude, not the result of a plan to mislead
Judge McCleve. In any case, we are not convinced
that any of the statements defendant claims are
false or wrongfully omitted would be material to a
determination of probable cause [citation omitted].

Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
record in this case establishes that Droubay acted recklessly or
intentionally in preparing the affidavit, and the falsehoods and
omissions were material to a determination of probable cause.
It is well established that "[fjalse statements in a
probable cause affidavit made knowingly, intentionally, or
recklessly can invalidate a warrant issued in reliance thereon
[citations omitted]."

State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah

1985), reh'g denied (1986), citing Franks v.Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188
(Utah 1986), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565.
The analysis under Franks and its progeny requires a
determination as to whether misrepresentations appear in the
affidavit and, if so, whether they were included intentionally or
with a reckless disregard for the truth.

If material

misrepresentations were included with the requisite intent, the
offensive information is excised and the remaining information in
the affidavit is reviewed for a determination as to whether probable
cause exists without the misrepresentations.
Material omissions may also be relevant to a
determination of probable cause.

See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191;
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People v, Kurland, 618 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1980), cert, denied 451 U.S.
987 (1981); People v. Winden, 689 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1984).

Some

courts require that the material omissions be inserted to determine
whether they would quash any probable cause finding, while others
require more severe sanctions, such as quashing the entire affidavit
where it can be established that an officer intentionally left out
facts which might have diminished any probable cause determination.
Id.
The three most glaring misrepresentations in the instant
case occurred in the second paragraph of the statement of facts, in
the statements depicting who the officers followed to the Montgomery
address, and in the descripton of surveillance of the Montgomery
house.
In the second paragraph^, Deputy Droubay stated that
within the past ten days, between February 24 and March 5, 19874, he
had used a confidential informant to execute two controlled buys of
cocaine at 533 Montgomery Avenue (Appendix D at 2). At the hearing,
Deputy Droubay acknowledged that this statement was false since the
C.I. had never been inside the Montgomery address (T. 19, 20).

3 The first paragraph outlined Deputy Droubay's
background and experience. He had been an officer for two and
one-half years at the time he obtained the search warrant (see
Affidavit, Appendix D at 2). At the time of the hearing on the
Motion to Suppress, he was unemployed and no longer on the force
(T. 4).
4
The search warrant was signed on March 10, 1987, so
this statement regarding timing of the buys was also inaccurate.
Had the buys been made in the ten days prior to signing of the
search warrant, they would have been made between March 1 and
March 10, 1987. Judge McCleve apparently made no effort to clarify
this discrepancy.
- 8 -

The affidavit also contained significant
misrepresentations as to which individual was followed to the
Montgomery address.

The affidavit stated that the C.I. set up his

deals with the dealer Randy and the dealer Randy then drove to the
Montgomery address on each of two occasions.

The affidavit also

referred to a telephone call from Randy saying the "stuff" was on
the scale (Appendix D at 2-3).
Contrary to the affidavit, during his initial testimony,
Droubay was unequivocal in pointing out that the C.I. did business
with the dealer Randy but that a third person by the name of Brad
drove from the Atherton address to the Montgomery address (T. 9,
13-15).

This discrepancy is critical since, if the C.I. gave money

to Randy and Randy then drove to the Montgomery address, the
connection with the Montgomery address is much closer than if the
C.I. gave money to the dealer Randy and some unrelated third person
drove to the Montgomery address.
Droubay also misrepresented his surveillance of the
Montgomery house.

In asking for a no-knock warrant that could be

served at any time, Deputy Droubay stated that:
Independent surveillance also supports the fact
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that
the persons residing in the residence are usually
away during the day.
Appendix D at 4.

However, Deputy Droubay watched the Montgomery

house on only three occasions.

He kept no notes but testified that

only one of those occasions was during the day and two were in the
evening (T. 66-67).

During those visits, Droubay saw only three
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people enter or leave the house.

Although he stated in the

affidavit that the people who reside at the Montgomery house were
"usually away during the day" (Appendix D at 4), he testified that
he did not know who resided in the house and that during his single
daytime visit, he saw children present (T. 59-60)•

The presence of

children during the day suggests, contrary to the sworn statement of
Deputy Droubay, that the occupants were present during the day.
Furthermore, a single daytime surveillance is not sufficient to
support the conclusion that the occupants were "usually" gone.
The most glaring omission in this case was the fact that
all of the officers involved followed the unrelated third person to
the Montgomery address; no officers stayed at the Atherton address
so the officers would not have known if the C.I. left or other
people came to the Atherton house.

This is important since the

controlled substance could have come from the Atherton apartment,
one of Randy's roommates, someone else entering the Atherton
apartment while the officers were gone, any number of cars which
were linked to the Atherton apartment, or any other source that the
C.I. or Randy or someone else drove to while all the officers were
gone.
Hence, Droubay included significant falsehoods in the
affidavit and left out significant information which might have
caused the magistrate to refuse the search warrant.
Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals that
"[d]efendant has not presented any compelling evidence that
Droubay"s somewhat inaccurate and incomplete statements were made
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knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly[]" (slip op. at 4), there is
abundant evidence in the record that Droubay acted with the
requisite intent.
In Nielsen, this Court found the state's contention that
the false statements included in the affidavit were not made
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for truth "entirely
unpersuasive," pointing out:
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only
of the need for accuracy in the information
provided to a magistrate in support of an
application for a search warrant, but also of the
importance of absolute truthfulness in any
statements made under oath.
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).

An officer's awareness of the need for

accuracy and truthfulness in preparing a sworn affidavit should
therefore be taken into account in determining whether the officer
had the requisite intent when he included the falsehoods.5
The inconsistencies in Droubay's testimony and his
attempts to cover lapses, when considered in conjunction with the
affidavit itself6, establish that Droubay acted intentionally or
with a reckless disregard for the truth when he prepared the
affidavit.

5

As the Court acknowledged in Franks, a police officer
is also aware of the haste with which an affidavit in support of a
search warrant is often reviewed. 57 L.Ed.2d at 680. In the Third
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, the judge generally signs search
warrants during a brief recess in arraignments.
6
Because it is unlikely that an officer who
intentionally misrepresents facts in an affidavit will acknowledge
that fact when subpoenaed for a motion to suppress, one of the few
ways in which a defendant can establish that the affiant had the
requisite intent is to analyze the testimony and the affidavit step
by step.
- 11 -

Defense counsel subpoenaed Droubay for the Motion to
Suppress and directly examined him.

During the first few minutes of

direct examination, Droubay acknowledged that the focus of the
investigation was a person named "Randy" who lived in the Atherton
apartment (T. 9) and that there were usually at least two persons in
the apartment.

He further testified that a person other than the

dealer Randy, a "blonde-haired younger fellow," was the driver and
that the C.I. had told him prior to the first buy that Brad would be
driving (T. 15-16).
The dramatic change in Droubay's testimony after he
reviewed the affidavit suggests that he acted recklessly or
intentionally in preparing the affidavit.

After Droubay reviewed

the affidavit, he suggested that Brad and Randy were the same
person, that he knew Randy would be driving, and that Randy was
using an alias (T. 18, 41, 47, 62). This was contrary to his
earlier testimony that he knew a person other than Randy would be
driving.
In addition, Droubay attempted to suggest that the
Atherton apartment had been covered by an officer despite the fact
that Droubay had read his report and there was no indication in the
report that such coverage had occurred (T. 38-9) (see Appendix E).
The other officers involved, none of which were in charge as Droubay
had been, clearly remembered that no one covered the Atherton
apartment (T. 72, 74-5, 84). This apparent fabrication while
testifying suggests the ease with which Droubay intentionally
misrepresented the facts.
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The location of the false information in the affidavit
also supports a determination that Droubay intentionally included
the falsehoods.

The second paragraph containing the

misrepresentation that two controlled buys occurred at the address
to be searched was the first information concerning the basis for
the search warrant to reach the magistrate.

The organization and

substance of the remainder of the affidavit did little to dispel the
incorrect impression initially given the magistrate and thus added
support to a finding that the deputy intentionally misrepresented
the facts to the magistrate.
Given the recognition in Nielsen of an officer's
knowledge of the need for accuracy in an affidavit, the glaring
misrepresentations in the affidavit, the completely contradictory
testimony offered by Droubay after reviewing the affidavit, and
Droubay's attempts to cover up his failure to leave officers at the
Atherton address, the record in this case establishes that, at the
very least, Deputy Droubay acted recklessly, and more likely
intentionally, in preparing the affidavit.
Pursuant to the fourth amendment approach in Franks,
intentional falsehoods are excised from the affidavit and the
affidavit is then reviewed for a determination of probable cause.
Without the falsehood regarding a controlled buy occurring at the
Montgomery house and absent the falsehood that the C.I. gave money
to the dealer who then drove to the Montgomery house, the affidavit
is left with information that the C.I. entered the Atherton
apartment on only two occasions and an unknown, unrelated third

- 13 -

party drove to the Montgomery house.

The significant omission that

the Atherton apartment was not under surveillance for the thirty to
sixty minutes while all the officers followed the third person to
the Montgomery house must also be considered.
Under a totality of the circumstances approach, this
information is not sufficient information for a finding of probable
cause.

Other than the "coincidence in timing" of the two visits to

the Montgomery house by a person who had been present in the
Atherton house, nothing in the affidavit indicated that cocaine sold
to the C.I. came from the Pyeatt house and not from the car or the
Atherton house or some other source.

See State v. McManus, 243

N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1976) .
In State v. Hadd, 619 P.2d 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980),
relied upon by the Court of Appeals, the officers followed a known
drug dealer to the appellant's apartment twice in one evening.

The

second trip to the appellant's apartment occurred after the C.I.
received a sample of the marijuana, agreed to purchase more, then
watched the dealer make a telephone call.

Immediately after the

telephone call, the dealer drove directly to appellant's apartment.
Thereafter, officers arrested the dealer, found a bag of marijuana
in his possession, and immediately obtained a telephonic search
warrant for appellant's apartment.
In the present case, the connection between Mr. Pyeatt's
home and the transaction which occurred at the Atherton address is
more attenuated than the connection between the appellant's home and
the transaction in Hadd.

Several people were at the Atherton
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address who could have supplied the drugs to the C.I.

The two

transactions took place several days apart and the search warrant
was obtained several days after the second transaction.

The person

driving to the Montgomery address was not a known drug dealer and
could have just as easily been an unwelcome guest who was asked to
leave during the transaction or a decoy who officers eagerly
followed.
Furthermore, no one ever saw controlled substances in the
Montgomery house or knew who lived there.

See State v. Hansen, 732

P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983).
The minimal surveillance in no way established that drug operations
were being carried on at the Montgomery house.
Finally, the minimal number of transactions (two) and the
time lapse suggest not only that there was not enough information in
this case to establish probable cause to search the Montgomery house
but also that, even if controlled substances had been at the
Montgomery house at the time of the two transactions, there was no
indication it would still be there.7
After excising the intentional or reckless
misrepresentations in the affidavit, and considering the intentional
or reckless omissions, officers lacked probable cause to search the
Montgomery premises.

Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this

1

Officers did not watch the Atherton apartment between
the two transactions so the amount of drug activity at that location
was not known nor was the potential for other sources. Furthermore,
when the officers searched the Montgomery house on March 10, 1987,
they found only a small amount of cocaine.
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Court grant a writ of certiorari on this issue and review the
federal constitutional claim raised herein.
POINT II. BY REFUSING TO ADDRESS THE STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED
TO DECIDE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH
SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT.
In his opening brief at pages 31-38, Mr. Pyeatt asked the
Court of Appeals to interpret Article I, § 14 of the Utah
Constitution differently from the fourth amendment where material
misrepresentations are included in an affidavit or material
information is omitted.

In particular, Mr. Pyeatt argued that,

under the Utah Constitution:

(1) material misrepresentations which

are intentionally included should invalidate the entire affidavit
(rather than excising the offensive portions).

See People v. Cook,

583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska
1986); and (2) where an officer negligently includes falsehoods,
those falsehoods should be excised and the remainder of the
affidavit reviewed for a determination of probable cause.

See

People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) (modified on denial of
reh'g); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978).
The Court of Appeals dealt summarily with Appellant's
state constitutional argument:
Because we find no precedent or rationale
compelling a different result under our state
constitution, we do not address the issue.
Slip op. at 4-5.
Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, case
law and rationale supporting a separate analysis exist in this case.

- 16 -

Appellant's argument under the state constitution was that
our constitution offers greater protection in a search and seizure
context than does its federal counterpart.

History provides a

rationale for finding greater protections under Article 1, § 14 of
the Utah Constitution than under the fourth amendment to the federal
constitution since the Utah Constitution was adopted at a time when
many of the citizens of this state may have had an interest in
greater protections from intrusions into their homes.8
Furthermore, Utah case law explicitly suggests the
possibility of a different construction for the Utah Constitution in
this specific context.
In State v. Nielsen, this Court pointed out that its
decision that the falsehood contained in the affidavit did not
invalidate the search warrant was not dispositive of how the issue
might be resolved under Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
The Court acknowledged that "the federal law as it has developed
since Franks v. Delaware [438 U.S. 154 (1978)] is not entirely
adequate" and that "[t]here is no stronger argument for developing
adequate remedies for violation of the state and federal
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures
than the example of a police officer deliberately lying under oath
in order to obtain a search warrant."

_ld. at 192-3.

Hence, Nielsen

suggests that an analysis under the Utah Constitution which is

8

The State had recently outlawed polygamy and federal
troops were stationed in Utah to control activities. Many citizens
still practicing polygamy had an interest in protecting against
entry into their homes.
- 17 -

distinct from that in Franks may be appropriate where
misrepresentations are included in an affidavit in support of a
search warrant or omitted therefrom.9
In addition to Utah case law explicitly suggesting the
possibility that the Utah search and seizure provision be
interpreted differently from its federal counterpart, case law from
other jurisdictions supports the separate analysis advanced by
Mr. Pyeatt.
Cases decided prior to Franks v. Delaware, such as United
States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v.
Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974), held that "[i]f the affiant
intentionally makes false statements to mislead a judicial officer
on application for a warrant, these render the warrant invalid
regardless of whether or not such statements are material to
establishing probable cause."

Such a rationale makes sense since,

where an officer has intentionally misrepresented some facts in an
affidavit, the entire affidavit becomes suspect.
Since Franks, several courts have held that intentional
misrepresentations in an affidavit invalidate the entire affidavit
and warrant under a state constitutional analysis.

See, e.g.,

9 The issue of whether an intentional or reckless
misrepresentation in an affidavit automatically invalidates the
search warrant and the issue of the effect of negligent
misrepresentations were not directly presented to the high court in
Franks. In Franks, the appellant "conceded that if what is left is
sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are
irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no reason to
believe the information was false, there was no violation of the
fourth amendment." 438 U.S. at 172.
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State v, Malkin, 722 P.2d 943, 946 (Alaska 1986); State v. Caldwell,
384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978).
In Cook, the Court noted:
Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes,
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit
does not leave the remaining allegations unaffected
and hence presumptively true. The fact that the
misstatements are intentional injects a new element
into the analysis, to wit, the doctrine that a
witness knowingly false in one part of his
testimony is to be distrusted in the whole.
583 P.2d at 140 (emphasis added).
The Cook Court summed up that "although the court can
excise the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the
remainder to be true.

Lacking a reliable factual basis in the

affidavit, the court has no alternative under settled constitutional
principles but to quash the warrant and exclude the product of
search.

[Citations omitted.]"

_Ld. at 141.

Furthermore, there is case law from other jurisdictions
supporting Appellant's argument that negligent misrepresentations
must be excised and the remaining portions of the affidavit
considered in determining whether to uphold the warrant.

See

People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) (modified on denial of
reh'g); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978).
Hence, rationale and precedent both exist for deciding the
issue differently under the Utah Constitution.

Appellant's analysis

under Article I, § 14 is especially compelling since (1) a review of
the affidavit and Officer Droubay's testimony shows, by
circumstantial evidence, that Officer Droubay acted intentionally or
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recklessly in putting together the affidavit, which would require
invalidation of the warrant without further analysis pursuant to
Appellant's state constitutional theory, and (2) assuming, arguendo,
that Officer Droubay did not act intentionally or recklessly, the
negligence of including obviously false information would require
excision of that false information and therefore invalidate the
warrant due to the lack of probable cause in the remaining portions.
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court review
this issue and address his state constitutional arguments.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Petition for
Writ of Certiorari be granted and that this Court review the issues
addressed herein.
Submitted this

3

day of^tfune, 1989.

rOOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

C.tddtf
FOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that ten copies of the
foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Supreme Court, 332 State
Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 and four copies to the Attorney
General's Office, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
this

8

day of June, 1989.

<jfac-((to/
JOAN C .

DELIVERED by

WATT

this

of June, 1989.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Steven J. Pyeatt,
Defendant and Appellant.
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Attorneys:

Brooke C. Wells and Joan C. Watt, Salt Lake City,
for Appellant
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Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
In this appeal, defendant raises two related challenges
to his conviction.1 First, he claims Officer Droubay's
affidavit fails to allege sufficient facts upon which Judge
McCleve could base her finding of probable cause to issue the
search warrant. Second, defendant claims Judge Rigtrup erred
by denying defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine and
related contraband found during the search of defendant's
house. We find no error and affirm defendant's conviction.
We first consider whether Officer Droubay's affidavit in
support of the search warrant established probable cause to
search defendant's residence. Defendant correctly
acknowledges
1. Defendant's third challenge, that the search warrant lacks
particularity/ is without merit.

the scope of our review, which is limited to determining
whether Judge McCleve "had a substantial basis to conclude
that in the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit
adequately established probable cause for the issuance of a
search warrant." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah
1987) (per curiam). "Probable cause" in this context "is
nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence sought
is located at a place indicated by the policeman's
affidavit." United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th
Cir. 1982). Moreover, we give great deference to Judge
McCleve's determination that probable cause existed for
issuing the warrant. See, e.g., Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129;
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1364 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
Defendant claims Droubay's affidavit is an insufficient
basis for the warrant because it (1) does not establish a
"fair probability" that cocaine was located at defendant's
residence, (2) does not specifically and clearly establish the
basis for Droubay's attestation to the confidential
informant's reliability, and (3) is stale due to the length of
time between the last controlled buy and the issuance of the
warrant. We find no merit in any of these contentions. On
the contrary, our review of the affidavit convinces us that
Judge McCleve "had a substantial basis to conclude that in the
totality of the circumstances" probable cause existed to issue
the warrant.
Droubay's affidavit, while somewhat inaccurate and
overstated in certain aspects, nonetheless establishes a
pattern of "dealer/broker" drug trafficking. Droubay claims
that he and his fellow officers arranged two controlled buys
of cocaine at the Atherton apartment.2 on both occasions,
the "dealer" left the apartment and was followed by the
officers to defendant's residence. When the "dealer" returned
2. While one sentence in the affidavit states that the
cocaine was obtained from defendant's residence, we fail to
see how this technically inaccurate representation could have
misled Judge McCleve, especially in light of the next thirteen
paragraphs discussing in detail the two controlled buys. The
affidavit contains a number of clear statements to the effect
that the "dealer" actually produced the cocaine at the
Atherton apartment, but was believed to have retrieved it from
defendant's residence. We of course reject the suggestion
that Judge McCleve may not have carefully read the entire
affidavit.

a80274-CA
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to the Atherton apartment, he delivered cocaine to the
confidential informant. On one of those occasions, the
informant received an incriminating telephone call from the
"dealer* during the time the officers knew the "dealer- was at
defendant's residence. This sequence of events establishes
probable cause to believe the "dealer" retrieved the cocaine
from defendant's residence, and that more cocaine and related
contraband could be found there. While the officers'
methodology is certainly not a model for a narcotics officer
training manual, we cannot say that Judge McCleve erred in
issuing the warrant. Defendant's specific challenges do not
change our conclusion.
First, we are not convinced that Judge McCleve erred
simply because the affidavit did not specifically allege that
cocaine had been seen in defendant's residence, nor that the
"dealer" ever stated he was going to defendant's residence to
get the drugs. £fiS State v. Hadd, 127 Ariz. 270, 619 P.2d
1047, 1053 (Ct. App. 1980) (probable cause to search
"broker's" house was established by an affidavit alleging that
drugs were found in "dealer's" car immediately after he was
seen leaving "broker's" house). While such particular
allegations would certainly be helpful in establishing
probable cause, defendant cites no authority rendering them
mandatory. In fact, we think such an inflexible approach is
inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances standard.
Second, we do not find it significant that the warrant
was issued after only two controlled buys, see Hadd. 619 P.2d
at 1049-50, 1053, or that the last buy possibly took place two
weeks before the warrant was obtained. See State v. Hansen,
732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). While at least one case
suggests in dicta that perhaps two trips to the "broker*s"
house by the "dealer" during controlled buys would be
insufficient to establish probable cause, State v. witwer, 642
P.2d 828, 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), that case was not
decided under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. We
decline to adopt the "three-buy minimum" defendant, in effect,
proposes. Instead, affidavits in support of search warrants
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The totality of the
circumstances alleged in Droubay's affidavit, coupled with two
controlled buys, is sufficient to establish probable cause to
search defendant's residence.
Finally, we cannot agree that the warrant was improperly
issued because much of the information contained in the
affidavit was relayed to Droubay by a confidential informant,

aan?74-ra

or perhaps even by other officers. See State v. Nielsen, 727
P«2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986) ("The use of hearsay evidence to
establish probable cause does not necessarily undercut the
validity of a warrant*"), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1986).
Droubay stated that his informant was reliable and based his
attestation on specific prior experiences with the informant.
Defendant has not convinced us that Judge McCleve erred in
concluding Droubay's affidavit demonstrated informant
reliability. Ss£, e.g., State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099,
1102 (Utah 1985) (informant's veracity can be established
through an affidavit stating that the informant has previously
given reliable information).
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Judge McCleve did not
err in issuing the warrant based on Droubay's affidavit.
Our final inquiry is whether Judge Rigtrup erred in not
suppressing the evidence. We will affirm this ruling unless
the factual assessment underlying it is clearly erroneous.
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). A trial
court's factual assessment is not clearly erroneous unless our
review of the evidence leaves us with a "definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.* IdU (quoting
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100,
123 (1969)). Defendant takes exception to Judge Rigtrup1s
ruling that Droubay did not act in "bad faith." Implicitly,
Judge Rigtrup concluded that Droubay did not knowingly,
intentionally, or recklessly include false statements or omit
material information in his affidavit. SSLfi State v. Slowe,
728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985). We are not persuaded that this
ruling is clearly erroneous.
Defendant has not presented any compelling evidence that
Droubay*s somewhat inaccurate and incomplete statements were
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. We find it more
likely that the misstatements were the result of Droubay's
confusion, oversight, or ineptitude, not the result of a plan
to mislead Judge McCleve. In any case, we are not convinced
that any of the statements defendant claims are false or
wrongfully omitted would be material to a determination of
probable cause. See id. at 111 (minor discrepancies in
affidavit "did not undermine the essential truth of the
allegations"). The basic facts we hold to establish probable
cause are essentially undisputed.
Because we find no precedent or rationale compelling a
different result under our state constitution, we do not

address the issue. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's
conviction.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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ORDER
DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

State of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent/

Court of Appeals No. 880274-CA

v.
Steven J. Pyeatt/
Defendant and Appellant.

Before Judges Orme/ Davidson/ and Bench.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing/
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Rehearing is
denied.

DATED th is

# * day of May, 1989.

FOR THE COURT:

Maryyfc Noonan
Cler/k of the Court

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of May, 1989, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR
REHEARING was mailed to each, of the parties named below by
depositing the same in the United States mail*
Brooke C. Wells
Joan C. Watt
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
R. Paul Van Dam
State Attorney General
Charlene Barlow
Asst. Attorney General
Dan Larsen
A s s t . A t t o r n e y General
B U I L D I N G
MAIL

David E. Yocom
Salt Lake County Attorney
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this 10th day of May, 1989.
C**-'

By

^~^^rt >'/ss /' *s*f' Case Manager/y
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231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84111
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.

cmi

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
C. Mike Droubay - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Narcotics
Division, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

(X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 157S West,
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and
a red front porch with black rod iron railing.

In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
Cocaine,
scales.

a white

powdery

substance,

cutting

agents, packaging

and

and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal

w
'-«"'• w<a« iak9 CoApv'-.*'-r:
.u<ruif Court $>,•
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PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
You are therefore commanded:
(X) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown)
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (pro<
under oath being shown that the object of this search m;
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm m,
result to any person if notice were given)
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for tl
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the sar
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifi
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain su<
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

c"

/"

day of March, 1987.

' L/. /" ?{{, < V"c

JUDGE'OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT

APPENDIX D

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
By: HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
): ss
)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

SHEILA MCCLEVE

450 SOUTH 200 EAST

JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That
(X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West,
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and
a red front porch with black rod iron railing.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
Cocaine,
scales.

a white

powdery

substance,

cutting

agents,

packaging

and

and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
Affiant
believes
the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crirae(s) of UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR VALUE.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts
are:

to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warran

Your affiant is a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff with tw
and a half years of law enforcement experience.
Your affiant i
presently assigned to the Narcotics Division. Your affiant has bee
trained by P.O.S.T., Utah Police Academy, in the identification o
narcotics.
Your affiant has also received continued education an
training
regarding narcotic
dealings
through
experienced
polic
officers and on the job experience.
Within
and March 5th,
cocaine, using
C.I. to obtain
Lake City, Salt

the past ten days, between the period of February 24t
1987, your affiant has executed two controlled buys o
a confidential informant.
Hereafter, referred to a
cocaine at 533 South Montgomery, the east duplex, Sal
Lake County, Utah.

On the first occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant, an
assisting Detectives, where the C.I. was searched. The C.I. had n
money, nor controlled substances, on his person. The C.I. was give
$275.00, consisting of two $100.00 bills, three $20.00 bills, on
$10.00 bill, and one $5,00 bill, and given instructions to purchas
3.5 grams of cocaine, known as an tfeight ball".
At that point, the C.I. left your affiant's vehicle an
walked directly to 4545 Atherton, in the Lexia Haven Apartmen
Complex, building #7, Apartment 144. He was observed by your affian
to enter that apartment building. He did not make any stops, diver
his paths, or make contacts with anyone, up to that point.
Approximately two minutes later, a male white, approxiraatel
5'9", 150 pounds, blonde, curly hair, known as RANDY, was observed t
your affiant leaving the apartment, went to the parking lot, and gc
into a 1982 Datsun, red in color, Utah listing:
MVT 214.
Thi
suspect was then followed by the Narcotics Squad to 533 Sout
Montgomery.
He made no stops, nor did he divert his path, prior t
arriving at the Montgomery address.
The suspect parked his car i
front of the Montgomery address, and was observed by myself ar
Deputy Herlin, to enter the east door of the red brick duplex at th*
time. The suspect stayed there for approximately twenty-two minutes
and then was observed by Deputy Judd leaving the same door of tl"
residence, getting back into his vehicle, and then again proceed*
south bound on Interstate 15.
He was followed by myself and the Narcotics Squad, direct!
back to 4545 Atherton, Apartment #144. He made no stops, nor did t
divert his path this time either.
The suspect arrived back at tt
apartment in approximately fifteen minutes, walked directly from hi
car back into the apartment, where approximately five minutes latei
the C.I. was observed to exit the apartment, and walk directly bac
to your affiant's vehicle.

PAGE Three
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH

WARRANT

The
Col. was re-searched
at that
time, finding
no U.S.
Currency, or controlled substances on him, besides a small paper
bindle,
inside
a plastic
bag, which
contained
a white
powdery
substance.
The package, containing the white powdery substance, was
field tested by your affiant.
A portion of which resulted in a
positive indication for cocaine.
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware that RANDY was
at the Montgomery address, C.I. received, at the Atherton address, a
phone call from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and that RANDY
would be back.
Your affiant received
information, at that time, from the
C.I. as he entered the a"partment, he was greeted by the suspect,
known to us as RANDY.
He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY
then left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine.
On the second occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant and
assisting detectives, where the C.I. was searched again, finding no
U. S. currency or controlled substances on him.
At that point, he
was given $220.00 in U. S. currency, consisting of two $100.00 bills,
and one $20.00 bill. The C.I. was given instructions at that time to
purchase two grams of cocaine.
The C.I. got back into his vehicle,
which had also been searched by your affiant, drove directly to 4S45
Atherton, Apartment
#144.
He did not divert his path, nor make
contact with anybody.
He then left his vehicle and walk directly to
apartment #144, and was given entrance.
Approximately three minutes later, the same suspect, known as
RANDY, exited the apartment and walked directly to the 1979 Mercury
Monarc, with Utah listing:
161 AMW.
He got into the vehicle and
proceeded out of the apartment complex, east on 45th South, and north
on Interstate 15, followed by the entire Narcotics Squad.
The
suspect
remained
northbound
on Interstate 15 to the
Redwood Road exit, took the Redwood Road exit to 5th South, went from
5th South, directly to 533 South Montgomery, where he was observed bv
Deputy Rigby to walk directly to 533 Montgomery and enter.
This
being sixteen minutes, from the time he left the Atherton address.
The suspect stayed
inside the residence for approximately
eight minutes, and then was observed by Deputy Rigby to exit the
residence, walk directly to his car, and proceeded to 5th South, then
to Redwood Road, then back to Interstate 15 southbound.
At
this point,
the
suspect
drove
directly back to 4545
Atherton, #144, without diverting his path, or making contact with
anybody.
He was observed by Deputy Rigby to park the car in the
parking lot, and walk directly to #144 and enter.

PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
One minute later, your affiant observed the C I , exit the
residence, walk directly to his vehicle, and drive to a pre-arranged
point, without diverting his path, or making contact with anyone. He
was
re-searched
approximately
four minutes, as was his vehicle,
finding no controlled substances, other than a small paper bindle,
containing a white powdery substance, which he was instructed to
order from the suspect known as RANDY.
The package that contained the white powdery substance,
portion of which was tested by your affiant.
It resulted in
positive indication for cocaine.

a
a

Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an
unnamed source)
Your affiant
purchase cocaine on
representation made
marijuana.
The C.I.
several occasions for

and assisting Detectives, have had the C.I.
at least eight separate occasions, and each
was born out by producing
either cocaine or
has also purchased marijuana and cocaine on
your affiant and assisting Deteccives.

Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential
informant
to
be
correct
and
accurate
through
the
following
independent investigation:
Your affiant has used information given to him by the C.I. to
make arrests of your narcotic dealers, said to obtain other search
warrants.
The previous search warrants obtained by your affiant and
other Narcotic Detectives using information, and controlled buys from
the C.I. have all been confirmed by producing controlled substances,
as
a
result
of
the
authorized
searches,
including
narcotics
packaging, and resulting in arrests of persons for violation on those
premises.
WHEREFORE, the affiant
seizure of said items:

prays

that

a Search Warrant

be

issued

for the

(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for
other good reasons, to-wit:
Your affiant
has purchased cocaine, via the C.I. on two
different occasions.
Independant surveillance also supports the fact
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that the persons residing
in the residence are usually away during the day.

PAGE FIVE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's
authority or purpose because:
(X) the property sought
of, or secreted.

may

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

be

quickly

destroyed,

disposed

|y/'day of March, 1987.

JUDSE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH

APPENDIX E

1

Q.

Assuming that this —

well, since it is

2

February or March, there was no question but that it was dark

3

outside?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Likewise, it would have been dark when you

6

followed the person in the car to the Montgomery address?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

And I understand the weather may have been bad

9

on at least one of those occasions?

10

A.

The weather, I don't recall.

11

Q.

You don't recall a blizzard or snowstorm?

12

A.

No.

13

it was fairly clear,

14

Q.

15

We were driving pretty fast, so I think

Now, when you left the Atherton address, who

did you leave to watch the Atherton apartment to make sure that

16 I no one entered or left?
17

A.

I believe it was Deputy Vaun Delahunty.

18

Q.

Who?

19

A.

1 believe it was Deputy Vaun Delahunty.

20
21

not really sure on that, however.
Q.

Would you look at your reports to see if it

22

indicates in any place that any officer remained at the

23

Atherton address?

24
25

I 'm

A.
indicate.

I have looked at my report, and it does not

And, again, I'm not sure if Vaughn was there or not,
38

1

Q.

I f O f f i c e r Delahunty was not there # then no —

2

A.

3

Q-

—

4

A.

Then no one was there.

5

Q»

And assuming just for argument sake that no

.Then no one was,
one would be there?

6

one was left there, then you nor no other officer could testify

7

tjiat the confidential informant did not leave in the interim

8

and come back; is that right?

9

A.

That's correct, ye<3.

10

Q.

And likewise, no one could be able to verify

11

whether anybody how had previously been in the apartment may

12

have left and returned?

13

A.

ghat's also correct*

14

Q.

pr that some unknown third individual may ha\

15

come into the Atherton apartment while you were gone?

16

A.

That's also correct, yes.

17

Q•

And you were not in any type of contact waN;h

18

y ° u r confidential informant during that time?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Now, with regard, again, to the confidential

21

informant, specifically, what was the arrangement made with

22

this person for his work with you?

23

case, particularly.

24

filed against that person.

I'm not talking about this

You said that there would not be charges
What type of charges and how many

25 J were not submitted for screening or were not filed against the
39

APPENDIX F

1

defense

that

2

Montgomery

3

Pyeatt's

4

Thank

this taking

Street

of evidence

from

the

address was in violation

State and Federal Constitutional

of Mr.
rights.

you.

5

THE COURT:

The Court

reviewed

6

memorandums, both memoranda

7

fairly complete notes on the matter.

8

that.

9

Court

I have a reasonably
observes

in making

10

determination

11

probabilities, not
Given

13

allow some credence

14

magistrate

15

deals

16

she

17

engaged

18

familiarity

19

assume

20

familiarity

21

Court.

the fact that

And

the

cause
with

the Court

to the conduct

in preliminary

must

of the

assume

has to

issuing

that Judge McCleve

hearings on a regular basis, that
on a regular basis

in that business
than

reviewed

accurate memory.

a probable

take

certitudes.

-- the Court

issues warrants

I did

I've

ruling, we are dealing

12

22

in this c a s e .

both

with greater

and

she's

intensity

is this Court, so the Court

that she has perhaps a greater
with these things than

The Court

23

motions

to suppress, and

24

thing.

But the Court

25

these kinds of actions.

the

reviewing

the most

observes a consistent
And
27

your

must

level of

in these cases gets
it is not

and

these
frequent
pattern

affidavit does

in

state

1

that

there were eight

2

the confidential

3

transactions, we have two controlled

4

warrant

5

some

6

Officer Drewbay,

7

that suggests

8

officers

issued

transactions, as I recall, with

informant.

in this c a s e .

inaccuracies, there f s

any bad

these
buys before

although

nothing

the strip search, giving

11

make contact, transfer

12

another place

13

Court

14

in.

15

common pattern

16

inferences .

to get

has observed

there are

in the testimony

in the

of going

the money

the drugs

from which

there's sufficient

and

and

location,
having

it's been

that

the officers can see a

they can draw

reasonable

all of those circumstances, I

think

19

and considering

20

Court

21

the affidavit

sufficient

22

determination

made by Judge M c C l e v e , therefore

23

the motion

-- reviewing

the totality

the

affidavit

of the circumstances,

there's nothing

insufficient

to vitiate

the

about

the probable

cause

denies

to suppress.
M S . WELLS:

aware, that

the

involved

18

25

him

then go to

is a pattern

in every case

And given

24

of

affidavit,

to one

the CI money

from that, I think

finds that

the

in this c a s e .

10

17

to

faith on the part of the

The pattern

And

And

there's nothing

involved

9

Prior

is the c a s e .

Your

Honor, as the Court

I mean, what I had
28

is

suggested

